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USEFUL PAMPHLETS

Attention might well have been called before to two Bulletins of the First District Normal School, Kirksville, Missouri. The first of these, officially known as Volume XV, No. 4, Ancient Language Series, Number 1, published April, 1915, is a pamphlet of thirty-two pages, whose contents are as follows:

The Qualifications of a High School Latin Teacher, J. B. Game (3-5); Latin as a Vocational Study, B. P. Gentry (5-7); A Symposium on the Value of a Knowledge of Latin (7-13), with subdivisions as follows: The Pedagogy Teacher's Point of View, W. A. Clark, The English Teacher's Point of View, A. L. Phillips, The History Teacher's Point of View, E. M. Violette, The Mathematics Teacher's Point of View, W. H. Zeigel, The Science Teacher's Point of View, J. S. Stokes; Excerpts From What Lawyers Have Said Concerning the Value to the Lawyer of Training in the Classics, compiled by B. P. Gentry (13-16); Excerpts From What Physicians Have Said about the Value to the Student of Medicine of Training in the Ancient Classics, compiled by B. P. Gentry (16-18); The Imagination in Education, also by B. P. Gentry (18-19); Caesar and the Great War, by T. Jennie Green (20-26); Illustrative Material, T. Jennie Green (27-30); Latin in the Grades, T. Jennie Green (31-32).

The other pamphlet, known officially as Volume XVI, Number 11, Latin Series, No. 2, published in November, 1916, contains the following:

Latin Below the Ninth Grade, T. Jennie Green (3-7); Books and Illustrative Material for High School Latin, apparently by T. Jennie Green (8-12).

To the statements made in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 10.145-146, 191, concerning travelling collections of lantern-slides may be added the fact that the Latin Department of the Kirksville Normal School has nine sets of slides which it lends to Schools (presumably to Schools in Missouri) without charge, except for transportation. Information concerning these slides can be obtained from Professor T. Jennie Green.

In *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 10.105 attention was called to a pamphlet entitled *The Classics in Mississippi To-day*, published in 1916, by The Classical Association of Mississippi. A pamphlet entitled *The Classics in Mississippi Today*, 1917, has also been published by the Association. The contents of this are as follows:

The Place and Importance of Greek, A. W. Mildner (3-5); Latin and the Sciences, F. J. Chastain (5-6); Reading Current Literature Through Classical Spectacles, F. Puckett (6-8); The Present Status of Latin Studies: Current Opinion and Statistics, A. L. Bondurant (8-19); Practical Value of Latin, M.

Roudebush, Dean of Women and Head of Economics Department, University, Mississippi (19-20).

Copies of the pamphlet may be obtained from Professor Alexander L. Bondurant, University, Mississippi.

To the efforts of Miss Frances E. Sabin to give practical help to teachers of Latin, especially in Wisconsin, attention has been called several times in *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* (see e. g. 8.41-42; 9. 105-106). Readers of *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* may be interested in the pamphlet, prepared recently by Miss Sabin, entitled *The Latin Laboratory of the Wisconsin High School of the University of Wisconsin*. The pamphlet sets forth the aims of the Laboratory, and the activities of the Laboratory (3-5). On pages 5-10 there is a statement of the equipment of the Laboratory, actual and prospective. C. K.

THE LATIN SUBJUNCTIVE OF DETERMINED FUTURITY

(Concluded from page 164)

An expression of determined futurity with an indefinite subject becomes an expression of a general truth. The temporal element becomes obscured. But there is no real shift in the modal meaning. The expression may be described as one of achronistic determination.

In Latin the subjunctive of determined futurity in the second person indefinite is quite commonly used achronistically in the statement of a general truth⁹.

Trin. 670 Quom inopiast, cupias; quando eius copias, tum non velis.

Amph. 705 Non tu scis? Bacchae bacchanti si velis advorsarier, ex insana insaniorem facies, feriet saepius; si obsequare, una resoluas plaga.

Trin. 1052 Siquoi mutuom quid dederis, fit pro proprio perditum; quom repetas, inimicum amicum beneficio invenias tuo.

Latin also used the present indicative in these statements of a general truth. With any person except the

⁹Compare Sonnenschein, *Unity*, 5 ff. For a list of examples see Hale, *Classical Philology* 1. 20 ff. Granting the presence in Latin of the subjunctive of determined futurity and the use of that subjunctive in these statements of a general truth, we have at hand an easy explanation of the use of the second person indefinite in subordinate clauses. Subordinate clauses with the second person indefinite are generalizing conditions; and the subjunctive is the same as that appearing in the statement of a general truth. Examples of paratactic generalizing conditions are to be seen in *assem habebas* of Petr. 77, quoted below, and in Horace, *Carm.* 4.4.65 *merces profundo, pulchrior evenit*. But it is not necessary to suppose that the Latin generalizing condition was developed directly from an original parataxis.

second person indefinite the present indicative was always used, as in Capt. 234 *Nam fere maxuma pars morem hunc homines habent: quod sibi volunt, dum id impetrant, boni sunt*. But the modal meaning of such a present indicative is the same as that possessed by the second person indefinite subjunctives in the examples just quoted. What is asserted is, not that men are good, but that by a law of human nature they are bound to be good. Even with the second person indefinite the present indicative could be used. Compare Publilius Syrus 52 *Bis peccas, cum peccanti obsequium adcommodas*.

The future indicative with an indefinite subject was also used achronistically to express a general truth. As in the case of the present indicative, the verb might be in the third person or in the second person indefinite. An example with the third person is Most. 289 *Pulchra mulier nuda erit quam purpurata pulchrior*. In the following we have examples of second person indefinite subjunctive and future indicative side by side: Petronius 77 *Assem habeas, assem valeas; habes, habeberis*. Compare also the *sententia* in Horace, *Serm. 1.1.61*, with Augustine, *De Disc. Christ. 11.12*¹⁰, where the future indicative is used.

(2b) *The action contemplated is one which, it is seen, involves successful or unsuccessful effort on the part of some agent*. There is an implication that someone is bound to succeed or not to succeed in doing something, an implication of capacity or of opportunity. Such an implication is not due to the modal meaning, but rather to the verbal meaning sometimes assisted by a negative or such an adverb as *vix* or *facile*¹¹. As illustrations from Homeric Greek may be cited Od. 16.438, with the subjunctive, and Od. 15.321, with the optative. Latin examples are Ad. 830 *Quo vis illos die redducas* (the implication that prompts a translation 'can' or 'may' is due to *quo vis . . . die*); Bacch. 27 *Videas mercedis quid tibi aequum dari*; And. 205 *Ne temere facias: neque tu hoc dicas tibi non praedictum: cave*. 'You shall not (be able to) say'; Hec. 288 *At sic citius qui te expedit his aerumnis reperias*. Another example is *pellas* in Eun. 1080. In this case the capacity or opportunity implication is helped by the adverb *facile*: 'easily shall' implies 'easily can' or 'easily may'.

The following examples with the third person may be quoted¹²: Amph. 985 *Nec quisquam tam audax fuat homo qui obviam obsistat mihi*; Truc. 907 *Numquam hoc uno die efficiatur opus, quin opus semper siet*; Amph. 1060 *Nec me miserior feminast neque ulla videatur magis, 'nor is one to be seen more wretched', 'nor can you see one more wretched'*.

¹⁰With the exception of these two, the examples of second person indefinite future indicative quoted by Professor Hale, *Classical Philology* 1.41 f., have the capacity implication. See below, page 171.

¹¹The implication of capacity is quite common in the case of an imperfect indicative accompanied by a negative, as in Cicero, *De Sen. 79* *Nec enim dum eam vobiscum, animum meum videbatis . . .*

¹²Blase, *Historische Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache*, II. 1.123, quotes Truc. 907 and Amph. 1060 as examples of subjunctives used in a future sense. Compare also Rodenbusch, *De Temporum Usu Plautino*, 57 ff., and Kroll, *Glotta* 7.127.

The subjunctive in the first example is not volitive. The precise interpretation is not easy; but I am inclined to think that the meaning is, 'No man shall (be able to) get up enough courage to stand in my way'. The implication of capacity is clear in the other two examples. In Amph. 1060 the second person indefinite active might have been used.

The use of verbs of perceiving, knowing, and finding in the second person indefinite subjunctive is common in Latin. The implication of capacity or opportunity is clear in the case of such verbs. As in the other cases of the second person indefinite discussed above, the temporal meaning disappears. The statement becomes one of a general truth. Compare the general statements in Od. 4.78, 'no mortal man shall (can) vie with Zeus', and Il. 8.143, 'by no means shall (can) a man hinder the will of Zeus'. Latin examples are And. 460 *Fidelem haud ferme mulieri invenias virum*¹³; Trin. 554 *Quamvis malam rem quaeras, illic reperias*; Pseud. 1176 *Ubi suram aspicias, scias posse eum gerere crassas compedes*; Cas. 562 *At quom aspicias tristem, frugi censeas*; Curc. 292 *quos semper videas bibentes esse in thermipolio*; Publilius Syrus 167 *Fortunam citius reperias quam retineas*; Horace, *Serm. 1.4.86* *Saepe tribus lectis videas cenare quaternos*. Other examples are Aul. 505, Hec. 58, Most. 278, Capt. 420, Mil. 689, Most. 243, Poen. 836, etc.

With verbs other than those mentioned the implication may appear, but not so clearly: Publilius Syrus 278 *Iniuriam facilius facias quam feras*; 645 *Virtute quod non possis, blanditia auferas*; 21 *Avarum facile capias, ubi non sis item*; Sallust, *Cat. 52.4* *Nam cetera maleficia tum persequare, ubi facta sunt*.

In these statements of a general truth, the idea of capacity was often too prominent to be left to implication; hence *possis* was often used with a dependent infinitive. This was true even when the infinitive was a verb of perceiving, knowing, or finding. The examples, of course, logically belong under 2a. Compare Cato, *Agr. 17.1* *Id semen legere possis*; Lucretius 1.327 *quid quoque amittant in tempore cernere possis*. Other examples are Lucretius 3.856 (*accredere*), 4.1231 (*cernere*), 6.113 (*cognoscere*), Cicero, *Sex. Rosc. 75* (*reperire*), Horace, *Serm. 1.2.94* (*cernere*), 1.2.19

¹³The Plautine and Terentian examples with *reperias* are quoted by Bennett (*Syntax of Early Latin* 1.200) as examples of the 'attenuated should-would potential'. The list given contains some examples of an altogether different character. Some have the third person in an interrogative sentence. These cannot be discussed here; but the subjunctive is not equivalent to an indicative. In Haut. 606 the manuscripts have *poscit* or *poscet*, and there is no good reason for the emendation to *possit*. Haut. 620 has the third person in an echo question. In Most. 148 *queat* depends on *quin*. With the exception of Hec. 288, Eun. 1080, and Ad. 829, which Bennett says have a subjunctive equivalent in meaning to a future indicative, the other examples have the second person indefinite. Why these should be separated from the examples of the 'can-could' potential (page 206) it is impossible to see. For example, the *videas* of Mil. 94 has as much of the capacity idea as does the *videas* of Capt. 420; and the same is true of the *videas* of Aul. 505. Moreover, the capacity-implication is rather stronger in most cases of *reperias* than it is in *videas*. As for *velim*, *malim*, *notim*, I see no reason for supposing that the modal meaning was 'attenuated'. The fact that the Roman often said *velim* where he might have said *volo* and where an English speaking person would say 'I wish' proves nothing.

(*credere*). As an example of *possis* with a verb not belonging to one of the classes mentioned above may be quoted Lucretius 2.220 tantum quod momen mutatum dicere possis. Interesting is the example from Publilius Syrus 645, quoted above, in which the idea of capacity is expressed directly in the relative clause and left to implication in the principal clause.

The future indicative in the second person indefinite could be used achronistically to express a general truth. See above, page 170. With such verbs as *invenies*, *reperies*, *videbis*, *scies*, and occasionally others, there will be an implication of capacity, as in the case of the subjunctives just discussed. Compare Mil. 659 At quidem illuc aetatis qui sit non invenies alterum; Men. 93 Facile adservabis, dum eo vinclo vincies; Publilius Syrus 664 Facile invenies qui bene faciant cum qui fecerunt coles. Other examples are Vergil, Geor. 1.365 (*videbis*), Publilius Syrus 673 (*reperies*), and the following with *invenies*: Publilius Syrus 393, 676, 721, Catullus 89.6, Petronius 56, Tacitus, Dial. 8. With *videatur* of Amph. 1060 should be compared the third person passive in Afranius 7 Haut facul, ut ait Pacuvius, femina invenietur bona. In Juvenal 14.42-43 the subjunctive *videas* is paralleled by the future *erit*. In Cicero, De Am. 63 we have *ubi eos inveniemus?* which should be compared with *ubi enim istum invenias?* of the next paragraph.

(3) *The action or situation contemplated is one under the control of an agent; the determinant is logical or ethical.* As illustrations from Greek may be cited Od. 22.350 ('is bound to choose to say') and 20.135 ('you are not to blame one'). It is in case of verbs and verbal phrases denoting mental action, mental attitude, or the expression of thought that the implication of the logical or ethical determinant will most easily arise. Since, for example, the act of believing is not subject to the will of another, a statement that 'you are bound to believe' naturally implies that considerations of logic condition the belief and hence that 'you ought (logically) to believe'. It is true that, under circumstances giving rise to such an expression of determined futurity, a volitive expression might be used. On the one hand, an expression of determined futurity, in case the action is under the control of the person concerned, serves to give directions. The Greek examples referred to above are sometimes translated into English by the imperative; and the *credas* of And. 787 is mistaken for a volitive subjunctive 'with *non* for *ne*'. On the other hand, a direct command to do that which the person commanded may do or leave undone may carry an implication that he ought to do it, logically or ethically¹⁴. In Latin, for positive sentences we unfortunately lack such marks of distinction as the Greek *αἰ* and *κε*; but in negative sentences the determined futurity meaning

may be indicated by the choice of the negative, as in the following examples with the second person definite: And. 787 Hic est ille: non te credas Davom ludere¹⁵; Trin. 606 Non credibile dices. At tu edepol nullus creduas. The use of *neque* may not be as conclusive evidence of a non-volitive modal meaning as is the use of *non*; but I have no hesitation in classing the subjunctives of the two following examples as subjunctives of determined futurity to be translated by 'you are to'¹⁶: Eun. 77 neque praeter quam quas ipse amor molestias habet addas, et illas quas habet recte feras; Eun. 1080 neque istum metuas ne amet mulier. In the absence of evidence to the contrary the following example should be considered as having the same modal meaning: Ad. 830 At enim metuas ne ab re sint tamen omissiores paulo.

It is probable that a good many first person plural subjunctives unaccompanied by a negative have the determined futurity meaning with a logical or ethical determinant. For example, in Eun. 609 Perlongest, sed tanto ocius properemus, the meaning may be 'let us hasten', but more probably it is 'we are to hasten'. Still more certain are the two Ciceronian passages quoted above, page 163, Ad Att. 2.5.1, and Ad Att.9.6.2. With the negative *non*, however, the determined futurity meaning is clearly indicated: Scipio, in Gellius 4.18.3 Non igitur simus ingrati; Cicero, Pro Cluent. 155 A legibus non recedamus. Other examples are Seneca, Epp. 99.14, and Quintilian 7.1.56.

In the last example quoted, the subject is indefinite and the directions given are general. It was, of course, possible to give general directions by the use of the volitive subjunctive, as in Cato, Agr. 5.2 Vilicus ne sit ambulator¹⁷, but the subjunctive of determined futurity was especially well fitted for this purpose. Examples of the second person indefinite so used are to be quoted below. The modal meaning of determined futurity is to be seen in the following examples with the third person: Cato, Agr. 5.3 Iniussu domini credat nemini; Ennius, Ann. 509 Nemo me dacrumis decoret neque funera fletu faxit; Horace, Epp. 1.18.72 Non ancilla tuum iecur ulceret ulla puerve; Quintilian 1.1.5 Non adulescat ergo ne dum infans quidem est sermoni qui

¹⁴Fleckeisen, following Priscian, unnecessarily emended to *ne credas*.

¹⁵I omit discussion of the subjunctives accompanied by *neque* in the contract, Asin. 751-807. But I now believe that I was mistaken in assuming (American Journal of Philology 16.496 f.) that these subjunctives are volitive.

¹⁷The examples with the imperfect and the past perfect subjunctive and negative *ne* sometimes quoted in discussion of the so-called subjunctive of 'obligation or propriety' do not belong here. Men. 611, At tu ne clam me comesses prandium, has its *ne* from a correction of a second hand of B; but the *nec iam* of the first hand may have been a mistake for *nec clam*. On the other hand, Bothe and Ritschl emended *comesses* to *comessis*, and this gives better sense. *Ne faceres* of Pseud. 437 depends on *nevis* of the preceding line. The colon should be placed after *nequiquam*. Simo has just said, 'I don't want him to act that way'; and Callipho responds, 'But that doesn't count. You're not wishing that *you did not* act so in your youth'. The use of the pluperfect subjunctive, as in Cicero, Pro Sestio 45, *ne poposcisses*, Ad Att. 2.1.3, and *ne emisses*, Verr. 2.3.195, furnishes a problem in the development of the pluperfect subjunctive which apparently has no connection with the use of the present subjunctive now under discussion. The imperfect subjunctive could express what *was to be done* (logically or ethically) from a past point of view. The *non* of Trin. 133 *non redderes* is perfectly regular.

¹⁴Compare "Go to the ant, thou sluggard". An expression of wish under similar circumstances may imply 'obligation'. Compare Od. 18.79. See Frank, Classical Philology 3.7. With Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 1.41 Quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat, compare the proverb as it appears in Aristophanes, Vesp. 143, where the optative is used.

dediscendus sit. Compare further Cicero, *De Re Pub.* 4.6.6 and *Pro Planco* 15, both with *nec*.

Examples without a negative are the follownig: *Amph.* 959-961 *Atque ita servom par videtur frugi sese instituere: proinde eri ut sint, ipse item sit: voltum e voltu comparet: tristis sit, si eri sint tristes: hilarus sit, si gaudeant.* In *Bacch.* 652-662, we have a number of examples of a similar character. Compare also *Truc.* 855 *blitea et luteast meretrix nisi quae sapit in vino ad rem suam: si alia membra vino madeant, cor sit saltem sobrium.* In *Truc.* 230-233 we have directions concerning the proper treatment by a meretrix of an impoverished love. Add *Persa* 125 *Cynicum esse egentem oportet parasitum probe: ampullam, strigilem, scaphium, soccos, pallium, marsuppium habeat; Cicero, Pro Murena* 30 *Quod si ita est, cedat opinor forum castris.* . . . Here belongs also *Phor.* 243, in case the correct reading is *cogitet*.

With the second person indefinite, the truth stated is more general than in the case of the examples with the third person just quoted. The sentences express achronistically what is to be done logically or ethically. The action expressed by the verb is one clearly under the control of the agent. The verbs are verbs of mental action or mental attitude: *Merc.* 553 *Demum igitur, quom seis iam senex, tum in otium te conloces, dum potes ames; Phor.* 243 *Peregre rediens semper cogites*¹⁸; *Truc.* 163 *Dum vivit, hominem noveris: ubi mortuost, quiescat.* Cato furnishes a number of examples, as in *Agr.* 36.

Examples with a negative apparently do not occur in early Latin; but the following sententiae of Publilius Syrus have the negative *non*, and the subjunctives, therefore, are clearly not volitive: 126 *De inimico non loquaris male sed cogites; 175 Feras, non culpes quod mutari non potest.* With this compare 432 *Necessita tem ferre non flere addeceat.* The negative in the last two examples should lead us to take the following sententiae of Publilius Syrus as examples of the subjunctive of determined futurity: 187 *Feras difficilia ut facilia perferas; 421 Nihil turpe ducas pro salutis remedio; 470 Per quae sis tutus, illa semper cogites; 507 Quicquid coneris quo pervenias cogites.* Compare further 107, 136, 189, 244, 248, 343, 472. The modal meaning of the second person indefinite subjunctive in the following example is indicated by the *χρῆν* of the Greek original (*Euripides, Phoen.* 524) of which it is a translation. Compare the *χρή* of the conditional clause, which expresses determined futurity, but with a determinant of *natural* necessity: Cicero, *De Off.* 3.82 *Nam si violandum est ius, regnandi gratia violandum est: alii rebus pietatem colas.*

SALT LAKE CITY.

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REVIEWS

The Ethics of Euripides. By Rhys Carpenter. New York: Columbia University Press (1916). Pp. 48.

The main thesis of this most interesting and useful essay, reprinted from the *Archives of Philosophy*, for

May, 1916, is that there is in all moral judgments expressed by Euripides an underlying ethical principle, which Euripides held in common with the Greeks of his time generally, artists and poets, philosophers and moralists alike, namely, that whatever is in accordance with Nature is best, for man as well as for animals and plants. This implies, as Dr. Carpenter says (page 1), that "the Greek standard, the ethical and physical sanction, is not drawn from a supra-mundane or transcendental source, but from the physical world as it is or as it tends to be". Such a belief is opposed to the fundamental conception of Christian moralists, that the soul, the only important part of man, belongs wholly to a spiritual world, which is antagonistic to the physical, and that therefore man should seek to subdue Nature to himself and overcome the 'Flesh'.

The author begins with a quotation from Pindar's Ninth Olympian, 'Nature's way is ever the strongest and best'. It is of small importance in this connection that this English version of the passage does not accurately represent what the poet himself meant in this particular instance. In this ode, written by Pindar in his old age, success achieved by a man because of capacities belonging to the nature bestowed upon him by the will of the gods is contrasted with what may be accomplished by powers acquired by training, powers which are "ungodded", as Professor Gildersleeve puts it. Nor is it of much consequence that Dr. Carpenter sometimes violates the rule 'nothing too much', and goes too far, as we all are prone to do, in tracing a fundamental principle where no principle is involved, or where, at least, no principle is present to the consciousness of the author under discussion. Pindar's words, stripped of their context, express tersely and strikingly a prevalent belief of the ancient Greeks. And this belief, as Dr. Carpenter shows by many citations, permeates the ethical teaching of Euripides and gives the unity of a system to utterances which at first seem inconsistent. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is, in Dr. Carpenter's opinion, but an elaboration and formal development of the same idea.

The fundamental principles of Greek ethics, exemplified in Euripides's dramas, are outlined in this essay as follows. 'Nature' is the world in which we live. Every species has its particular nature. That form of any *infima species* which is the perfect realization of its nature Plato called the 'idea' of that species, and Plato went so far as to attribute to these 'ideas' an objective existence apart from any or all the individuals of that species. A perfect rose would be one which completely conformed to its 'idea', one in which nature, unrestricted, attained complete realization. Man is like the rose, only, with him, development is not mere physical growth. "As a good rose is a perfect rose", Dr. Carpenter says, "so a good man is a perfect man", one in whom the 'nature' of man attains a perfect realization. In so far as he acts in accordance with his nature properly understood he acts rightly, in so far as he acts contrary to his nature he acts wrongly. Ideal Nature is the proper norm for man, as for every other

¹⁸The reading of Fleckeisen, following the manuscripts except A.